I. Introduction
In New York City, almost 14% of elementary school pupils are foreign-born. Hailing from an astonishing breadth of countries (192) , speaking a wide array of languages and dialects (161), these students are educationally and socioeconomically diverse.' While immigrant students undoubtedly offer native-born students opportunities to learn about other cultures, countries, and languages, immigrants also place unique burdens on schools to provide appropriate instruction in English, remediation and other supplementary services. These opportunities and burdens are not evenly distributed across schools, even within New York City's single school district. As shown in Schwartz and Gershberg (2001) and Ellen, O'Regan, Schwartz, and Stiefel (2002) , some schools serve virtually no foreign-born students while others serve relatively few nativeborn students and there is a good deal of clustering of students with others from their region of origin. Thus, New York City's schools vary substantially in the representation and characteristics of immigrants. Perhaps not surprisingly, there is also significant variation in the level and mix of the resources available at the school level. This article examines the relationship between immigrants and school resources using
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Although a fully satisfying behavioral model of school expenditure determination remains elusive, the analyses yield insight into the possible determinants of school spending within a single school district. That said the results presented in this article are best viewed as descriptive. Our goal is to examine, statistically, factors that explain variations in expenditures across schools in New York City, with an emphasis on determining whether schools serving larger shares of foreign-born students receive greater (or lesser) funding, either because or in spite of their particular characteristics.
Except for a small amount of federal funding provided through the Emergency Immigrant Education Program (EIEP) to assist schools serving recent immigrants, no resources are specifically legislated for immigrant students. And, there is little in the way of policies or legislation specifying the provision of supplemental programs or resources for immigrant children per se. Certainly, no explicit resource policy favors immigrants from one country or region or speaking any particular language.
2 What, then, explains the disparities in resources across schools serving different immigrant populations? One explanation may lie in differences in the prevalence of educational needs or characteristics that require greater resources. For example, some immigrant groups may include a disproportionate share of students with inadequate academic preparation for their grade level, or with problems using English, or with disabilities. Others may be disproportionately poor. If school district resources are allocated to individual schools depending upon the cost of educating their particular student population, differences in student needs should translate into differences in spending.
Notice that the distribution of resources may be driven by considerations other than cost differentials. School resources may reflect the political power and preferences of the school community, including, but not limited to, the families of the school children. If immigrant communities have less political power, they may be less successful in garnering resources for their schools. Or, if immigrant communities place greater importance on other public services, local politicians may respond to their preferences by directing fewer resources to their local schools, in favor 304 of alternative services. If immigrants join nativeborn communities with similar needs and concerns, however, immigrants may enjoy considerable political power and success in garnering school resources.
Why should we care about this relationship between school resources and immigrant children? Four reasons are paramount. The first stems out of a concern for equity. There is evidence, although limited, that immigrant students get fewer resources than native-born students, which, if true, might seem unfair, in and of itself. Further, it might hamper the academic performance of immigrants as well as the native-born pupils in their schools. While recent research by Schwartz and Stiefel (2003) suggests that, on average, the academic performance of immigrant students exceeds the performance of the native-born, some immigrant students, such as those born in Guyana, earn consistently lower test scores than native-born students. Further, as detailed in a recent issue of the Harvard Educational Review (Volume 71, No. 3, 2001 ) devoted entirely to immigrant children, there is also a growing body of research suggesting that immigrant students face considerable challenges in American schools and diminished academic performance as a result. 3 The second reason we should care about the distribution of resources originates from a concern about efficiency. Allocating and using resources efficiently requires understanding the cost of educating students with different characteristics. How much more (or less) does it cost to educate an immigrant student? And if there are cost differentials, to what extent are they due to language proficiency or poverty rather than nativity per se? Disentangling the cost factors is critical to designing school aid policies and using resources efficiently.
The third reason for concern is motivated by an interest in understanding the academic performance of immigrant students-does their (potentially apocryphal) superior performance reflect more generous school resources or triumph over adversity? Understanding the relationship between resources and immigrants is important because of its centrality in understanding the academic performance of immigrant children and the nativeborn students sharing their schools. Finally, the fourth stems from a concern about public policy toward immigrants. In a variety of contexts, journalists and pundits (among others) have suggested that immigrants adversely affect U.S. crime rates, welfare rates, fiscal burden, and employment and wages of native-born. A number of academic studies have, however, shown that accounting for socio-demographic characteristics mitigates or even eliminates the importance of nativity per se (Borjas & Hilton, 1996; Smith & Edmonston, 1997; Butcher & Piehl, 1998; Garvey et al., 2002) . Whether (or to what extent) immigrants adversely affect school resources and how much of this effect is due to nativity per se is, then, important to painting a complete picture of the impact of immigration on cities.
In this article we focus on five overarching questions: Does the level or character of school resources vary with the representation of immigrant students as a whole? To what extent are variations explained by differences in educational needs, such as language skills, and how much is explained by other characteristics, such as race? Are resources distributed differently to immigrants with special needs compared to nativeborn students with special needs? Do resources vary across birth regions of immigrants? And, finally, how do school resources respond to changes in immigrant populations? This article explores these questions in New York City elementary schools, providing descriptive analyses of the distribution of resources across schools with widely varying characteristics. Regressions capture the distribution of several measures of school resources (including spending on classroom instruction and other services, pupil-teacher ratio, and teacher characteristics) and their relationship to the characteristics of the immigrant student population (including size and birthplace).
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The article is organized as follows. In section II we review the literature on school-level spending and in section III we outline possible models of the determination of school expenditures within a single district. In section IV we highlight the institutional features of New York City's method of financing its schools and describe the data used for this study. In section V we present the results of our empirical work and in section VI conclude with a discussion of implications for policymakers.
II. Literature on School-Level Spending
While there are many studies, both theoretical and empirical, examining the determination of spending at the district level, there are only a small number of studies that have examined spending at the school level.
5 Much of the districtlevel literature is based on median voter models in which education and other local expenditures are determined by the outcome of majority voting. Bergstrom and Goodman (1973) and Borcherding and Deacon (1972) 6 are among the earliest, and classic, articles in this literature, and focus on modeling the demand for local services by the median voter. Since the median voter's demand depends upon his income, tax rates, tax prices, preferences, and the amounts and types of state and federal aid available, so, too does spending at the district level. An alternative view models spending using a cost function approach. According to this view, school spending reflects the minimum cost of providing some quantity of public education and focuses on identifying the factors determining differences in the costs of providing education across school districts-including, for example, the differences in costs driven by differences in student characteristics. (See Imazeki and Reschovsky 1998; Duncombe & Yinger 1999 for recent examples, or Downes and Pogue 1994) Studies of school-level spending are, in contrast, mostly descriptive, and there is a dearth of research estimating causal models of school expenditures. Many of the existing studies are motivated by an interest in investigating whether, or to what extent, the distribution of spending across schools is equitable. Summers and Wolfe (1976) examine the distribution of inputs across schools in Philadelphia. Rubenstein (1998) and Stiefel, Berne, and Rubenstein (1998) report descriptive regressions of school spending in Chicago, Rochester, New York City and Fort Worth. Betts, Reuben, and Dannenberg (2000) estimate similar regressions for California schools. Most recently, latarola and Stiefel (2003) analyze the distribution of school-level expenditures in New York City elementary and middle schools with an explicit focus on evaluating horizontal and vertical equity and equal opportunity. Schwartz (1999) estimates defacto school expenditure equations for Ohio schools, investigating the relationship between spending and the socioeconomic characteristics of the students within and between school districts. Similarly, Schwartz and Gershberg (2001) examine the relationship between school-level expenditures in New York City schools and the socioeconomic characteristics of the students, including the representation of immigrants. These studies are, on the whole, silent on the matter of what determines expenditures. Instead, they focus on understanding the implications of the process, whatever it is, on the equity of the resulting distribution.
III. Modeling School Spending
None of the studies in the literature develops a positive theory of expenditures at the school level to explain the variables that are included in the estimated models and developing such a theory is not straightforward. There are at least three broad ways to conceptualize the determination of school-level expenditures. One is to think of spending as determined by a set of formulas or budget rules that dictate the distribution of resources across schools. District administrators can then be viewed as passive players, following the various and sundry rules and formulae as written or otherwise communicated. In this case, regression models of school expenditures, or other resources, can be thought of as capturing defacto expenditure or budget equations that summarize the interplay of these formulae. Independent variables, according to this view, should include the factors that are specified in the formulae and budget processes and restrictions that may bind spending decisions.
To be specific, school districts allocate resources based, in large part, on the number of children enrolled in a school-larger schools receive more teachers, more administrators, larger school buildings, and so on. School enrollment, then, is a critical variable in a defacto spending model and there are likely to be significant nonlinearities in the formulae reflecting relevant threshold levels for receiving additional resources. Similarly, since the allocation of teachers to support bilingual instruction depends upon the number of limited English proficient students, regressions should include this variable. Other independent variables might include the percentage of the students in a school who are poor, or who score poorly on tests of basic skills, or are recent immigrants, since there are federal and state aid programs that provide additional funding to the district to assist these populations. Notice, however, that it is unlikely that resources are, in fact, simply allocated according to formulae.
There is abundant evidence that resource allocation decisions are made according to and constrained by a large number of regulations, restrictions and work rules specified in labor contracts.
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As an example, schools are typically allocated "teacher positions" rather than a budget to hire teachers. Thus, a school's choice among teachers does not, in general, depend upon the salary a teacher would earn-more experienced or educated teachers cost the school no more than an inexperienced teacher. At the same time, schools are constrained in their choice among applicant teachers by rules specified in union contracts that give senior teachers in schools elsewhere in the district priority in filling vacancies. (See Lankford et al. [2002] for more on the sorting of teachers across public schools in New York, Rubenstein [1997] for a discussion of resource allocation in Chicago, and Summers and Wolf [1976] for an early discussion of resource allocation in Philadelphia.) Thus, the defacto spending equation should be viewed as summarizing the ending distribution and not as an effort to estimate a formula that is used in practice.
A second way to think of school-level expenditures is as the result of a behavioral process in which schools minimize the cost of providing a given output level. If schools are cost-minimizers, then, school-level expenditures should be determined by input prices and the level of output produced, given the production technology faced by the school. Thus, independent variables should include: the prices of purchased inputs used by the schools, including, for example, teacher salaries; measures of the level of output produced by the school, including the number of clients served (i.e., enrollment) as well as the quality of the product produced (i.e., test scores and the like); variables capturing differences in the technology faced by the school, such as grade span or instructional level; and variables capturing the characteristics of the students served and their educational needs in particular, such as their prior test scores, poverty rates, and so on.
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A final way to think about school expenditures (and other resources) views school spending as the outcome of a political process, drawing upon traditional public finance models of district spending determination. In this view, observed school spending reflects the desired spending of voters, which, in turn, depends upon their incomes, intergovernmental aid, preferences for public education and for spending on each of the schools in the district, etc. In principle, voters could choose spending on different public schools just as they simultaneously choose spending on police and fire services as well as education: This might be a particularly appealing way to describe spending determination in the type of school district common in the United States, composed of one high school, one middle school and two or three elementary schools. Unfortunately, it seems less appropriate to apply this sort of model to large, urban school districts such as New York City's, with its hundreds of elementary, middle, and high schools. Nonetheless, the notion that politics and voter preferences play some role in determining school spending seems more than plausible and important to consider. And the implication is that variables capturing the political power of the school community, the party affiliation of the parents for example, would be important.
Rather than attempt to estimate and disentangle a structural model of school (and schooldistrict) behavior, the analyses in this paper rely upon reduced form regression equations, including explanatory variables suggested by these different theoretical approaches. We begin with the simplest model, capturing the bivariate relationship between resources and the percentage of students in the school who are foreign-born. The purpose is to provide a benchmark for more nuanced analyses. A second model includes variables capturing differences in school-level educational needs and student demographics, following, to the extent possible, the budget and cost models outlined above. This model also controls for student test scores, the grade span of the school and enrollment. We next turn to a set of models that includes variables identifying the characteristics of the foreign-born population, in an effort to understand whether immigrant students with particular characteristics are treated differently than native-born students with those characteristics. As an example, do resources differ between schools serving foreign-born limited English proficient (LEP) students and native-born LEP students, ceteris paribus? All of these analyses match resources for 1998-99 to data on school and student characteristics for 1997-98, since resource decisions are largely based on the previous year's data.
Our final set of regressions focus on investigating the relationship between the changes in immigrant populations and the changes in resources over time. How do resources respond to expanding immigrant populations? Because school populations change relatively slowly between adjacent years, we focus on the two-year changes in resources (between 1996-97 and 1998-99) . ' In all models, regressions are reported without weighting for school size. Because of the wide range in the size of schools at each level, and the propensity of immigrant students to attend larger schools, we also estimated models weighted by enrollment. Results were substantially unchanged. Finally, we have estimated the models to explain expenditures per pupil, rather than to explain expenditures per pupil in logarithms, for example, since many of the underlying formulas allocate resources on a dollar per pupil basis. We also estimated models using logarithms, however, and results were substantially the same.
IV. Public Education in New York City
Some institutional information about the process and restrictions governing school budgeting is useful to set the background. In 1998-99, the year of this study, New York City spent $10.5 billion educating approximately 1.1 million students in over 1,100 schools ($8,957 per pupil), making it the largest school district in the country in all of these dimensions. Approximately 47% of its revenue was locally raised, 43% was state funded, and 10% was from federal sources.
The New York City school district is dependent, which means its budget is part of New York City's general budget and directly competes with other municipal functions for funding. Until governance reforms enacted in the spring of 2002, the Board of Education (BOE) comprised members appointed by one of five borough presidents or the Mayor, and the BOE, in turn, hired the Chancellor.
In the period of this study, many of the decisions about resource allocation, curriculum, and instructional practices are not made by the central Board of Education or the Chancellor.
9 Instead, elementary (and middle) schools are administered in 32 geographically defined sub-city districts, called community school districts (CSDs). Each CSD is led by a superintendent and receives most of its revenues from allocations directly from the BOE. Some supplementary funding is raised through competitive grants or donations from philanthropists, foundations, and the like. CSD superintendents have a wide range of responsibilities for determining pedagogical and instructional practices, and, most importantly for our purposes, distributing resources to the schools within their districts. Notice, however, that superintendents are not free to distribute funds in any way they see fit. Instead, they are constrained by a wide array of regulations and restrictions issued by the New York City Board of Education and required by the contracts of unionized employees, most importantly, the teachers, in addition to those imposed by the state and federal government and the terms of various grant and aid programs (as described in Note 2).
As detailed in latarola (2002), for New York City:
The allocation from the BOE to the CSDs of the instructional portion (85% of the general education allocation) takes into account projected student counts, class size initiatives and regulations, and the individual sub-districts' average teacher salary. About 20% of this instructional allocation also takes into account the remedial needs of a sub-district's students by factoring in an adjusted student count based on the number of students testing below the state standard... .Sub-districts also receive a fixed amount ($27,500) per school for organizational support. For example a sub-district may allocate resources in the form of teacher positions based on individual principals' projections of enrollments by grade, conforming to the state and city initiatives mandating smaller class sizes in the lower grades, kindergarten through 3rd grade. In addition to these mandates, sub-districts may allocate resources in accordance with their own plans such as even smaller class sizes than state and city initiatives call for in kindergarten and first- School budgets for each academic year are prepared in the spring and summer prior to the beginning of the year and there is little room for revisions once school begins." Thus, observed school resources in any year should reflect, in large part, the characteristics and needs of the school in the prior year.
Data: New York City's Schools and Schoolchildren
This study makes use of data on 535 elementary schools over four years, 1995-96 through 1998-99. Data on school resources, finances and characteristics were provided by the BOE from school-level expenditure reports (SBER) and annual school reports (ASR). Pupil-level data containing information on student socio-economic characteristics and test scores were aggregated to create detailed school-level variables. For this article, we focus on elementary schools, as defined by the city, generally containing some subset of grades pre-K through 6. Schools serving primarily full-time special education students (typically the severely disabled) were excluded from the study, as were early childhood schools serving a high grade of second or third, schools with seventh and/or eighth grades (middle school grades), and schools missing critical data items (especially expenditures or enrollment). This includes a set of "umbrella schools" and sub-schools for which it was not possible to appropriately match expenditure data. In addition, 90 students were excluded from the analysis because they were missing data on birthplace. In total, we excluded 164 elementary schools (not special education) serving 79,345 students.
As shown in Table 1 , the elementary schools in our sample educate more than 371,000 students, more than 51,000 of whom (13.8%) are foreignborn. We use data on student country of birth to distinguish foreign-and native-born students. According to this definition, any reporting of a country of birth other than the United States or its territories is considered foreign-born. The implication is that a very small number of students we consider foreign-born may have been born abroad to U.S. citizens and so are not, strictly speaking, immigrants. Further, all other students are considered native-born including students born in Puerto Rico, or other U.S. territories, or in the United States to foreign-born parents.
We also make use of data that indicate whether a student entered the New York City public school system within the last three years, pursuant to the regulations of the EIEP federal aid program. According to this definition, more than 7.9% of the elementary students are recent immigrants. Turning to poverty and race, we find that the vast majority of students are poor, more than a third are Black (35%) and Hispanic (37%), and only 16% White and 12% Asian or other. Finally, more than 40% of all students (43.7%) are exposed to a language other than English at homegenerally because it is the primary language spoken by parents, siblings or primary caregivers. Note. Foreign-born are students not born on U.S. soil. LEP students are those who score at or below the 40th percentile on the Language Assessment Battery (LAB). Language exposed to at home refers to languages frequently spoken by guardians, siblings, relatives or friends. The proportion of students eligible for free lunch is calculated as a fraction of the students with non-missing data: 354,674 students in elementary schools have non-missing data for free lunch. Due to the large sample size all differences in means between the native and foreign are statistically significant at conventional levels.
arate regional groups of foreign-born students.' 3 Nearly one fifth of the foreign-born students (9,675) hail from a single country: the Dominican Republic. Large numbers also come from five other regions: the former Soviet Union, China, South Asia, the Caribbean, and Latin America.
As might be expected, many students (over 11 %) score sufficiently poorly on a test of English language skills to be considered eligible for services to address limited English proficiency (see Table 2 ). Most of these students speak Spanish; however, there are substantial groups of Chinese speakers and Russian speakers and many more LEP students speaking anguages shared by only a small group of students. 14 Do foreign-born differ from native-born students? As shown in Tables 1 and 2 , the answer appears to be yes. Foreign-born students are far less likely to be proficient in English (almost 29.5% are LEP vs. 8.1% of the native-born), more likely to report a primary language other than English (77.3% compared to 38.3%), and more likely to be poor (82.6% vs. 78.3%). At the same time, foreign-born students are less likely to be part-time (resource room) or full-time special education students (3.3% vs. 6.8% and 2.0% vs. 4. 1%, respectively). Finally, the foreign-born and native-born differ in their racial compositionthe foreign-born include a smaller share of Blacks (17.5% vs. 37.7%) and a larger share of Asian students (28.8% vs. 9.3%).
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What does this mean for resource allocation? Immigrants' lower rates of English proficiency and higher poverty rate means they are more costly to educate in some subjects, but their special education status is possibly an indicator of lower education need.'
5 They have higher test scores as well.
How different are students from different regions of the world? Our data (in Table 2 ), point to significant diversity in the regional groups. They differ in their English proficiency, for example: while more than half of the students from the Dominican Republic are limited English proficient, only 6% of the Caribbean students are LEP. There is also a wide range in the prevalence of special education students across regions. While 3.4% of Dominican children are in fulltime special education, less than 0.5% of Chinese students are in special education. Most dramatic, perhaps, is the difference in average test scores for these groups. While students from the Soviet Union, China, Europe, and Asia in general perform, on average, far better than the native-born, students from Latin America, South American, the Dominican Republic, and the Caribbean earn lower average scores. See Conger, Schwartz, and Stiefel (2003) for more detailed analyses of the differences between regions and Schwartz and Stiefel (2003) for more on the nativity gap.
As shown in Table 3 , the New York City public schools vary widely in the representation of the foreign-born, and in the resources they are allocated to educate their students. Notice the wide variation in the representation of foreignborn students-New York has some schools with virtually no foreign-born students while others are more than half foreign-born. Further, the differences in the characteristics of the native and foreign-born, and the students in each of the regional groups, suggests that any disparity in resources across schools may, at least to some extent, be explained by differences in the characteristics of their students.
Turning to the resource measures, we focus our analyses on six measures of school inputs. We begin by examining overall spending on general education students, which includes any spending on supplementary programs for part-time special education students, ESL programs, reading assistance, and so on.'" We also examine separately expenditures on classroom instructional services and all other services.'
7 Three other input measures are the teacher-pupil ratio, percentage of the teachers who are licensed and permanently assigned to their schools, and the percentage of teachers who have five or more years of experience, all of which measure the resources used to provide services for all students, including both general and special education students. Separate measures were not available for general education students only.
Note that there is broad variation in the resources of public schools in New York City."
8 On average, elementary schools spend $7,789 per pupil but this ranges from a low of $5,908 to a high of $10,799, reflecting both variation in classroom and non-classroom spending. While classroom spending averages $4,268 per pupil, it ranges from a low of $2,997 to a high of $6,621. Non-classroom spending is somewhat lower, on average, at $3,521, but the range is equally large. Schools vary widely in the number of teachers they employ per pupil. The average school in our sample has 6.5 teachers per 100 pupils, but the range is wide. The minimum is 4.2 teachers per 100 pupils, suggesting a pupil-teacher ratio of about 25, while the maximum is more than 2.5 times more generous-I 1.5 teachers per 100 pupils, suggesting fewer than nine students per teacher.
Other resources show similar diversity. While the average school employs a faculty that is 86% certified and 63% with five years of experience, at some schools, only about half are certified and less than one fifth experienced. At the other extreme, New York City has schools with faculty that are all certified and more than 95% experienced. These are dramatic differences. Finally, it is important to note that our school samples include schools that are both quite small (as small as 132 students) and quite large (2,672 students), allowing us to examine the impact of size on resources.
V. Results

Does the level or character of school resources vary with the representation of immigrant students?
As shown in Table 4 , the simple bivariate relationships between spending and the representation of foreign-born students are negative. General education spending per pupil is almost $19 lower for every 1% difference in the representation of immigrant students between schools.1 9 This translates into a $1,026 per pupil difference between schools with the lowest (1%) and highest (55%) percent foreign-born. Notice that much of this difference is due to differences in nonclassroom expenditures. While the coefficient on percentage foreign-born is insignificantly different from zero in the classroom expenditures, it is -17.3 in the non-classroom expenditures regression. At the same time, the teacher-pupil ratio declines significantly with the representation of immigrants-more immigrants mean fewer teachers per pupil. Notice, however, that the teacher characteristics show an opposite pattern-greater immigrant shares are associated with more licensed and certified teachers. And, the share of experienced teachers shows no relationship with the foreign-born. Together, these suggest that there may be something of a trade being made-312 less money and larger classes, for better-qualified teachers, a finding similar to that in latarola and . Of course, these models do not capture behavioral responses but are purely descriptive. Whether, or to what extent, these differences are driven by student and school characteristics requires additional variables, which we turn to next. Table 5 shows the results of estimating a set of equations that include additional explanatory variables including lagged test scores, enrollment vafiables, and school grade span in addition to those shown. Notice that adding the school-level educational needs variables yields somewhat different results. Here, we find that the effect of foreignborn students on overall spending is insignificant, and the negative effect on non-classroom spending is balanced, in part, by changes in classroom spending. (That is, the coefficient on percentage foreign-born for non-classroom spending declines from -17.311 in the bivariate case to -10.582 in the more fully controlled model.) Thus, schools with larger proportions of foreign-born students may receive fewer resources for non-classroom services such as counseling, parental involvement activities, attendance and outreach services. In the total expenditure equation, percentages of poverty, resource room, full-time special education and LEP students are all significant determinants, while race and gender variables are not. The implication is that the negative relationship between percentage of immigrants and total expenditures in the bivariate model is due to differences in the composition or traits of the foreign-born, who are less likely to be in special education, which have particularly large effects on spending, and overrepresented in the poverty and LEP groups, which have smaller (or in the case of poverty and nonclassroom expenditures, insignificant) effects on spending. In other words, the simple relationship exhibits classic specification bias.
To what extent are variations explained by differences in school-level demographic characteristics and educational needs, such as poverty or language skills, and how much is explained by other characteristics, such as gender or race?
In the teacher-pupil relationship, poverty and full-time special education are significant needs variables, with special education showing a particularly large effect, even though the spending data include only spending on general education programs. Again, race is insignificant, although m. CD\o jZ
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.0 D ,e, the percentage of females exhibits a negative relationship. Interestingly, the regressions explaining the qualifications of teachers, also in Table 5 , do not exhibit qualitatively different results than the bivariate regressions. The percentage of teachers in elementary schools who are licensed and permanently assigned still rises with the overall representation of immigrant students and only resource room and LEP groups are significant determinants among the needs variables. Even though each of these significant variables works to reduce the sign of percentage foreign-born (because foreign-born are under-and over-represented, respectively, and the sign of the coefficients are positive and negative, respectively), they do not remove the independent effect of immigrant students on licensed teachers. On the other hand, the percentage of immigrants continues to be unrelated to the percentage of teachers with five or more years of experience in the system. 20 Taken together, the results paint a portrait of tradeoffs being madebetter-qualified teachers and lower levels of support services.
Do resources respond differently to immigrants with special needs than to native-born students with special needs?
The results in Table 5 indicate that, for most resources, student demographics and education needs are significant determinants of school-level resources. Are foreign-born students with these characteristics treated differently than comparably situated native-born students? Are schools with larger percentages of foreign-born LEP students, for example, more or less likely to receive additional spending per pupil? As shown in Table 6 , with the very minor exception of resource room foreign-born, who have higher teacher-pupil ratios (by .0 10), the answer is "no." Further, the relationship between the percentage of foreign-born and the percentage of licensed teachers falls in significance to the 10% level, although the magnitude of the coefficient remains similar to the past regressions. It appears that resources do not really vary with the characteristics of the foreign-born in the ways that differ from the native-born. That is, there is no evidence that the foreign-born are discriminated against in providing resources for students with special needs.
Does the region of origin matter to the results?
While the overall results suggest only small differences between the foreign-born as a group and the native-born, the substantial differences in students from different world regions suggest that there may be particular immigrant groups that are treated differently. Thus, we repeat our analyses using regional variables rather than a single foreign-born category. As shown in Table 7 , the parsimonious regressions suggest that regions matter, and resources vary significantly across regions-(F statistics for the joint test of the region coefficients are all large and statistically significant at the 1% level.) As an example, while only East Asia is "different" for every single resource, most regions are seen to be "different" for at least one resource. Schools serving more students from East Europe, East Asia, South Asia, and Non-Hispanic South America are associated with lower total expenditures and lower teacherpupil ratios, sometimes also with greater teacher resources. Other regions such as West Europe, West Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, the Dominican Republic, and the Caribbean are significantly related to one resource (not the same one). Looking only at the signs and not the significance of coefficients, many of the region groups exhibit the same "tradeoff' we saw in the bivariate regressions-lower spending and larger class sizes on the one hand and larger percentages of licensed teachers on the other hand. Interestingly, we also see some differences between classroom and non-classroom expenditures. In some regions, the effects are offsetting, yielding no significant difference in total expenditures as seen for the former Soviet Union and China. In other cases, disparities compound-as in the Caribbean, South Asia, and East Asia-leading to quite high differences of between $35 and $109 in total expenditures per pupil.
What happens when we control for school education needs and demographic characteristics? Table 8 presents the results from the "controlled regressions." As before, the strengths of most of the relationships with region of birth become less powerful-the F statistics for regions as a group, although still significant at less than the 5% level for all but experienced teachers, decline by more than 50%. Thus, just as in the generic foreign-born regressions shown earlier, the addition of education needs and demographic characteristics mitigates the relationship between resources and immigrants. Interestingly, these regressions suggest that the differences in non-classroom spending are 
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Q. driven primarily by two regions-Eastern Europe and West Asia. Clearly there are significant differences in the experiences of the regional groups.
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What explains these different outcomes?
One explanation might be that the regression models include too few explanatory variablesthere is still omitted variables bias due to unobserved differences in these populations that we have failed to include in the models. There may be differences in the political power of the parent body, or differences in the students' educational needs not captured by our educational variables. To control for these, we estimate a model that links changes in resources to changes in independent variables. Results are show in Table 9 . This specification "sweeps out" any time invariant variables and can be viewed as a specification of a fixed effects model. The result will be estimates of the relationships between the foreignborn and the resources that are not tainted by bias due to omitted time-invariant variables. The results are striking-fixed-effects estimates show no evidence that the foreign-born are "discriminated against" as a whole, but, instead, insignificant positive coefficients indicate they may even get slightly more resources, on average. Interestingly, the subgroup analyses point to some difference in the treatment of foreign-born poor students (who seem to receive less than other poor kids) and foreign-born resource room students (who seem to do better).
"
VI. Discussion
What do these results suggest about the distribution of resources and immigrant students in public schools in New York City? First, while the simple bivariate relationships between the representation of immigrants and resources suggest immigrant students are treated differently, regressions that control for differences in the educational need and demographic characteristics of the students mitigate this result for total spending and teacher-pupil ratios. At the same time, the results point to an intriguing difference in the pattern of non-classroom spending favoring the native-born. Whether our regressions capture 'costs,' budget allocations or spending decisions, the results suggest that nativity, per se, is not an important determinant of overall school resources. This result is consistent with much of the literature on the effect of immigrants, although in the literature the effect (uncontrolled for demographic characteristics) is generally in the direction of harming the native-born by increasing crime rates or imposing more fiscal burden. Here the evidence points more toward resource allocation that is unfavorable to immigrants and the nativeborn students attending schools with larger immigrant populations, in the simple relationships.
Second, there is some evidence that trade-offs are being made, substituting one kind of resource for another. At least in the uncontrolled version of the regressions, less spending and larger class sizes may be compensated for by better-qualified teachers. Of course, this trade-off is mitigated when controls are added and, at that point, increasing percentages of immigrants remain statistically significant and positive only in terms of increasing percentages of licensed teachers. At the same time, differences in non-classroom expenditures are mitigated by differences in classroom spending. Note that to the extent that a tradeoff exists, it may be caused by movements of teachers on their own rather than any centralized decision. The teacher contract in New York City (and many otherjurisdictions) allows senior teachers to fill vacancies before junior teachers or new hires. Senior teachers may move to schools with easier-to-teach students, who in turn may be less likely to be in small classes or to be getting targeted funds such as Title I money.
2
Third, there is support in our results for parts of each of the three models of school spending described earlier. Enrollment, poverty, limited English proficiency status, and part-time and fulltime special education status, are all factors used to drive budgets to schools and these factors are statistically and practically significant in the estimated resource equations. On the other hand, the equations do not explain more than 70% of the variation in school resources in any specification, implying that they do not capture any rigid budget "formulas." In addition, the evidence of the importance of these factors does not rule out a cost model, which would have yielded similar results, plus, perhaps, significant coefficients for race and gender. Notice that while a cost model would ideally include input prices, since all schools in our study are in the same district, all schools face the same input prices, so that prices cannot be included in the regressions. Finally, even the political model could be partly supported by these results, if we think that the foreign-born lobby to make sure their children re-
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o Cl -CD N o 11 11 00-C; ceive resources based on their educational needs and not their newcomer status. In other words, different data, perhaps across multiple districts or even states, will be needed to make progress rejecting or confirming each model. This study has drawn on all models and used a "reduced form" model, which still allows us to thoroughly study patterns with respect to immigrants. Finally, the results here, that there is no "smoking gun" in terms of immigrants per se receiving more or fewer resources, lead naturally to the question of whether their academic performance would merit a different level or mix of resources. Do immigrants achieve at lower or higher levels than native-born students? Preliminary analyses suggest that immigrants, as a group, earn higher test scores, on average. (See .) Thus, our analyses suggest little reason for concern about inequitable treatment of immigrant students. Are resources allocated efficiently to accomplish academic goals? These are hard questions to answer and, in the end, require further analyses to consider, for example, the impact of immigrant students on the performance of the native-born sharing their schools. The absences of any persistent difference between immigrants and the native-born within subgroups (such as poverty) suggests that there may, in fact, be no special cost associated with immigrants above and beyond their specific educational needs. Dollars/Student: While Congressional funding has remained relatively stable in current dollars, the number of eligible students has grown. As a result, funding per immigrant student has fallen from approximately $62 in 1989 to $50 in 1990 and $43 in 1991. When inflation is taken into account, the decline in funding per immigrant student has been greater. Conger, Stiefel and Schwartz (2003) , immigrant students from different countries and regions differ significantly from one another, and consequently our analyses will include both immigrants as a whole and by different regional groupings.
APPENDIX B
5See Duncombe (1996) for a review of the literature on the determinants of district-level spending.
6 Theory and empirical estimation are based on a variety of local services. Borcherding and Deacon use education as one of several services in their empirical work, but Bergstrom and Goodman do not. 7Some researchers regard this last set as capturing differences in the inputs to the production process, where students are inputs. A slightly different (but empirically quite similar) view regards these variables as capturing differences in the production function for education-producing education in a school with many poor children, or with children who scored poorly in previous periods, may be characterized by a different production function than would appropriately describe production in a school with few poor children.
3All dollars are transformed from nominal to real using the CPI-U, with 1998-99 as the base year.
9 During academic year 2002-2003, a wide range of school reforms were implemented in New York City, including changes in governance and curriculum. The Board of Education was renamed the "Department of Education" and the mayor assumed greater control of the public schools. Because these reforms occurred after the period of this study, we continue to use the appellation "Board of Education" and describe the institutions during the 1995-1999 period. '°"Other sub-district initiated programs such as special reading hours or professional development specialists are also funded through sub-district allocations, in some cases on a per capita basis. Some sub-districts allocate a guidance counselor to each school, while others base the decision on other criteria such as the number of students in a school and some measure of history of need. Supervisory positions such as assistant principals or bilingual supervisors are allocated when a sub-district or contractual threshold is reached. Principals can and often do negotiate with sub-district superintendents on behalf of their schools for the extraordinary needs of their students or for special school initiated programs" (latarola, 2002, p. 25-26) .
"See Stiefel and latarola (2003) comparing the budget and expenditure data. ' 2 Most of these were lost either because we were unable to match expenditure data to the school demographic data, largely because these were schools-withinschools, and the like, because of schools closing or opening during the study period, or because schools included middle school grades (seven and/or eight). ' 3 The classifications used are a modification of the system used by the New York City Planning Commission.
' 4 Additional information on home language and English language proficiency of New York City students can be found in Stiefel, Schwartz and Conger (2003) .
Note that, for part-time special education students (PTSE) in particular, the classification could also reflect choices by parents or schools. 16 These include spending for the part-time special education students, a subset of general education students who are given extra services, often in a "pullout" setting for a period of the school day, but exclude spending on full-time special education students. ' 7 Classroom instruction includes teachers, educational paraprofessionals, other classroom staff, text books, librarians and library books, instructional supplies and equipment, professional development, curriculum development, contracted instructional services, and summer and evening school materials. Other services include instructional support, leadership, ancillary, and building items. More specifically, instructional support services include counseling services, attendance and outreach services, related services, drug prevention programs, referral and evaluation services, after school and student activities, and parental involvement activities. Leadership support and services include funding for administrators, other support staff, and supplies. Ancillary services include food services, transportation, school safety, and computer support. Building services include custodial services and other building maintenance expenses. "'See Appendix B for tables providing additional descriptive statistics for the schools in the sample. 1 9 AII models were re-estimated using the natural log of expenditures and results were qualitatively unchanged. We report levels to facilitate interpretation. 20 Models that have student educational attributes and poverty entered non-linearly do not show any qualitatively different results. Because the linear specifications are easier to interpret, they are included in the paper. In addition, the simple correlations among variables are rarely above .5, including between the percent foreign-born and other variables, so very high levels of multi-collinearity do not explain the results.
21 of course, the change models are unbiased only if the omitted variables were, indeed, time-invariant. If other time-varying variables have been omitted, and they are correlated with the foreign-born or region vari-326 ables, then it is still possible that there is some omitted variable bias, but this specification is clearly a big step in the right direction. 22 For a recent discussion of the school-level determinants of teacher mobility, see Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin (2001) ; Lankford, Loeb, and Wyckoff (2002) ; Scafidi, Sjoquist, and Stinebrickner (2003); and Clotfelter, Ladd, and Vigdor (2004 
